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Some Comments on Metaphysics E. 2, 3
C. J. F. WILLIAMS
I wish to call in question a certain interpretation of sentences in
Aristotle's Metaphysics E, an interpretation which is enshrined in the
English translations most widely used. According to this Aristotle is
interested here in the contrast between gradual and instantaneous
change. It is my belief that this distinction has no relevance at all to
the passages in question.
begin with the first two sentences of E. 3:
"On 6' ua\v apxal Kal aiTia yevrjTa Kal (t>dapTa avev rov
yiyveadaL Kal (t>delpecrdai, (t)avtpbv. el yap fir) tovt', e'^ avayKr]q
navT ecrrai, d rov yiyuonepov Kal (pdeipou'evov p.T) Kara avp.^t^T]Koc,
aiTibv TL avayKH] uvai.
should translate this as follows:
That there are principles and causes which are capable of coming
to be and perishing without (actually) coming to be and perishing is
clear. For if this were not so, everything would be of necessity, given
that there must needs be a cause of what non-accidentally comes to
be and ceases to be.
Christopher Kirwan translates thus:
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It is obvious that there are origins and causes that are able to come
to be and to be destroyed without [being in process of] coming to be
and being destroyed. For otherwise everything will be of necessity, if
whatever is [in process of] coming to be and being destroyed necessarily
has some cause non-coincidentally.'
The words which Kirwan candidly places in brackets are central to
his interpretation of the entire chapter. The word "process," without
the warning sign of brackets, occurs also in the translations of Ross
and Warrington,^ and the interpretation it embodies is to be found
in, if it is not derived from, the commentary on this passage ascribed
to Alexander of Aphrodisias.^
The difference between Kirwan's translation and mine lies, not
only in the occurrence in his translation of this word "process," but
in the construal of the phrase nrj Kara avfi^efirfKoq in the second
sentence. Kirwan takes this with airibv n avayKt] dtvai; I take it with
Tov yiyvofievov Kal (pdeLpofxevov. Again Kirwan's construal conforms to
that of the other translators. If nrj Kara avixl3€^rjK6q is taken in this
way, with aiTibv tl ocvayKr} etvai, the heavy emphasis on the present
tense of yiyvou'evov and (f)d€Lponevov involved in including the phrase
"in process of" in their translation is more or less inevitable.* To say
without qualification "there must needs be a cause non-accidentally
of what comes to be and ceases to be" would be to rule out altogether
the existence of things whose only cause is an accidental cause. It
would contradict a sentence of the previous chapter: tcoj/ yap Kara
ovn^t^r}Koc, ovTOiv r} yiyvojxkvicv kol to alrLOv eoTi Kara (TvulSe^rjKoc,
(I027''7-8). There has to be some restriction on the generality of
"what comes to be and ceases to be." On my interpretation, however,
Aristotle is restricting the necessity of having a cause to non-accidental
' Aristotle's Metaphysics Books T, A, E, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford 1971).
The same interpretation is to be found in W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford
1924), Vol. I, pp. 362 sq.
2 The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1928), Vol.
VIII; Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. and translated by John Warrington (London 1956).
' Alexander Aphrodisiensis, /n Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria , ed. M. Hayduck
(Berlin 1891). Hayduck (p. v) does not regard the commentary on Book E as a
genuine work of Alexander.
^ Not quite inevitable, since Aquinas manages to avoid it. He, like Ross and
Kirwan, construes fij) Kara avu^e^riKoc, with the succeeding, rather than with the
preceding words. But he does not interpret yiyvo^ievov and cpdaponkvov as referring to
process. His way out is to take the clause ti tov jiyvofievov . . . avayKt] tivai (1027^31-32)
as a genuine conditional, repeating the content of ei yap nfi roxno (1027^30-31).
Kirwan and I interpret it as a reason-giving clause, taken by Aristotle to state
something true, although we differ about what it states. (Aquinas takes the first
sentence of the chapter in the way I do.)
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comings to be and ceasings to be. The way is therefore open for the
backward-stretching chain of causality to come to an end with an
accidental coming-to-be: driXov apa otl fiixP'- tlvoc, ^adi^ei apxvq,
avTTi 5' ovK€Ti eiq aWo (1027M1-12).
If Ross and Kirwan's motivation for translating tov yiyuonevov Kal
(f)deLponeuov as "whatever is in process of coming to be and being
destroyed" is the construal of the second sentence, the immediate
consequence of it is their need to translate tov yiyueadai Kal (j>6tLpeGdai
in the first sentence in the same way. This makes the first sentence
an assertion of the existence of causes that come to be and perish
instantaneously. Kirwan has considerable difficulty in explaining how
the argument of the chapter as a whole can be taken to support this
thesis. On my interpretation the first sentence asserts the existence,
amongst possible causes, of some which are unactualized possibili-
ties— a rejection, in effect, of the Megarian modal thesis "If possibly
p, then p." This fits in admirably with the opening words of the
second sentence, which point out that admitting this thesis is tanta-
mount to admitting the determinist thesis "If p, then necessarily py^
It is, however, causal determinism that the chapter as a whole is
concerned to refute, and the third sentence of the chapter begins a
reductio argument against the thesis of causal determinism: suppose
every event is determined by some prior cause; then eventually the
series of causes of future events will reach back to the present or the
past; but what is or has been the case cannot now be otherwise; e^
auayKTjc, apa iravra iorai to. iabp-eva (1027''8-9). This is regarded as
absurd; and the statement of 1027''1 1-12, insisting that breaks occur
in causal chains, is brought in as the alternative. Where the break
occurs we have an apxv of which we can say: ecTai. ovv i] tov oTrorep'
fTi^Xf" ocvTT], Kal aiTLOv TT^c, ytv^oiicc, avTr}<^ aXXo ovdev (1027'' 12- 14).
Such principles and causes, before they occur, belong to the class of
things which are capable of coming to be and perishing without
having to come to be and perish. Now there would be no such class
if whatever could come to be did so. If "possibly p" entailed "/?," "/?,"
as we have seen, would entail "necessarily /?"; and if these were both
true, "possibly p" would entail "necessarily /?". So for there to be a
class of things which come to be, but which do not, in virtue of some
prior cause, come to be necessarily, there has to be a class of things
"which are capable of coming to be and perishing without (actually)
'" Aristotle shows himself aware of this equivalence, which, as I am about to argue,
is crucial to the understanding of this chapter, not only by his words at 1027''30-31,
but also by his attributing to the Megarian determinists, in Metaphysics 0. 3, the thesis
that potentiality is indistinguishable from actuality.
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coming to be and perishing"— which is how I translate the first
sentence of E. 3. The uncaused causes of 1027''12-14 do, of course,
themselves actually come to be; but they have to belong to a class of
ytvqTO. which, at a time when they have not so far come to be, includes
others which never will. It is the existence of these which the first
sentence of E. 3 asserts.
Ill
Support is claimed for the view that these sentences are concerned
with "processes" by a similar interpretation of a sentence in E. 2.^
The sentence is found at 1 026*^22-24:
TOiv n€P yap aXXop rpoTov optojp eoTi yepeaLq Kal (f>dopa, to)p bt
Kara crvn^e^riKoq ovk earip.
Kirwan translates:
with things-that-are in another sense there is [a process of] coming to
be and destruction, but with things [that are] coincidentally there is
not.
Again Aristotle's contention is supposed to be that accidental beings
come to be and perish instantaneously. If this were what the sentence
meant it would have little connection with the remarks which precede
it. These mention certain arguments of the sophists, which are said
to be for the most part concerned with the accidental. Examples
given are: Whether musical and literate, or musical Coriscus and
Coriscus, are different or the same; Whether everything that is, but
not always, has come to be, so that if, being musical, someone has
come to be literate, he has also, being literate, come to be musical.
Clearly the sophists were getting entangled, or entangling others, in
puzzles over being {eipai) and coming to be {yLyptadaL). They were
drawing attention to sentences like
(1) Someone musical is literate
(2) Coriscus is musical
(3) Someone being musical has come to be literate
(4) Someone being literate has come to be musical.
If (1) and (2) are taken as assertions of identity, the sophists used
what we should now call Leibniz's Law to derive from "Coriscus has
come to be musical" and from (3) and (4) the prima facie absurdities
^ See Kirwan, op. cit., pp. 192, 196; and Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame
(London 1980), p. 6. Cf. Ross, op. cit.. Vol. I. pp. 360, 362.
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Musical Coriscus has come to be musical
Someone musical has come to be musical
Someone literate has come to be literate.
Aristotle's regular response to sophisms like this is to draw a distinction
between per se identity and accidental identity,' a distinction which
has close connections with two other distinctions, that between per se
and accidental unity and that between per se and accidental being. It
is the last of these which, in my view, is relevant to the sentence at
1026''22-24.
But is this view correct? Has the sentence at 1026^22-24 any close
connection with the preceding passage? Whether or not this is so
depends on the translation of the first part of 1026''22: br}\ov bt kol
€K T(bv tolovt(jov Xojoiiu. The phrase rcbv tolovtoov Xbyoii' echoes toiovtol
tO)v Xbyoov of 1026''20— the arguments of the sophists which I have
sketched. Ross and Kirwan, however, see it as having a different
reference. Ross has to defend with parallels his interpretation of
TOLOVTOOV as forward-looking against the more natural backward-
looking interpretation. He and Kirwan take it to refer to arguments
like that to be given in 1026''22-24. (What arguments would be like
this, and in what sense is it an "argument?") The presence of./cal
might be thought to support this, by indicating that we are about to
be given new evidence for the proximity of to avu^efirjKoc, to to nrj
6v. This view is encouraged if ^aij/crai in 1026''21 is translated (with
Kirwan) by "obviously": brjXov bi kol then comes out naturally as "as
is plain also." But 4>aiv(TaL yap to avu^e^rfKoq lyyix^ tl tov ixtj ovtoc,
should, perhaps, rather be translated "for the accidental seems (to
be) something approximate to non-being." The copula is here omitted
after (l)aiveTai, so we cannot know whether what we have is elliptical
for (j)aip(TaL ov or (t>aLU(Tai eivai. The rule ''4>otivoixai <jiv quod sum,
quod non sum (j)aivotxaL tLvai" is therefore inapplicable.
1 am, however, inclined to construe the sentence as if it were etvai
which was present after e'77Li(; tl— tl itself is a sign of reservation on
Aristotle's part. So "seems to be" rather than "obviously is" is
preferable as a rendering of ^aii^erat. Again, this sentence, as yap
indicates, is not a conclusion drawn from the exhibition of sophistical
arguments, tolovtol tCou Xbyoiv, but a comment on them. What it
suggests is only represented as a conclusion, as something shown to
' See Alan Code, "Aristotle's Response to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic,"
Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1976), 159-86; Gareth B. Matthews, "Accidental
Unities," in Language and Logos, edd. M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge
1982), pp. 223-40; and my own interpretation of Aristotle's distinctions, "Aristotle's
Theory of Descriptions," in The Philosophical Rei'iew 94 (1985), pp. 63-80.
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be true, by the following words, dfjXov be ... , for which 1026''22-24
provides a backing, as the yap of 1026''22 makes clear. driXov be Kal
eK Tcbv TOLovTwv Xoyoju cannot, therefore, be introducing a further
reason for the conclusion. So the Kal here is not to be translated
"also," but by emphasizing in some way the succeeding words. My
own way of translating drjXov be Kal Ik tO^v tolovto:v Xbyo^v would be
"This is clear from such arguments themselves." The following
sentence explains this, by showing that the fallacy of some at least of
the arguments lies in the assumption that there is yeueaic; and (f)dopa
of ra Kara ovti^t^T]Koq, ovra. This harks back to a premise of one of
the sophistical arguments, ivav b av y, fir] ad be, yeyouev. It is
unbelievable that the remark about yeveaiq and ^dopa at 1 026*^22-24
has no connection with this premise. What then is the connection?
IV
The connection cannot be discovered without understanding the
structure of the sophism which, as I see it, 1026''22-24 is designed
to solve. This argument is not easy to reconstruct. Aristotle's sketch
of it is given in 1026''18-20:
ei TTCiv b av rj, fir] ael be, yeyovev, axrr' ei yLOvaiKoq (t)u ypannarLKOo,
yeyove, Kal ypafxixar ikoc, oiv novoLKoq.
The consecutive clause here is a hypothetical proposition, but the
sentence as a whole is an indirect question introduced by el: the
sophists query the apparently analytic "Whatever is, but has not
always been, has come to be" on the grounds that, if it is true, (3)
and (4) are mutually implicative. (It is clearly immaterial which is
taken as implying which.) However, the connection between "What-
ever is, but has not always been, has come to be" and its alleged
consequence is not immediately obvious.
The connection is quite overlooked in recent reconstructions of
the sophism.^ Here the propositions ixovaLKoc, oov ypa/xnaTLKoq y'eyove
and ypanixaTiKoc, oiv fxovoLKoq (y'eyove^ are translated "The musical
person has become the literate person" and "The literate person has
become the musical person." With "singular terms" in both subject
and complement position, and the truistic assumption that what a
person has become he now is, Leibniz's Law is thought to be enough
to license substitution of complement for subject, and vice versa. No
appeal to the principle Trav b av
f), /xr) ael be, yeyovev is needed.
^ By Code and Matthews, whom I follow, for the sake of argument, in my
"Aristotle's Theory of Descriptions."
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However, the absence of the definite article from Aristotle's actual
exposition of the sophism and the presence of the participle (bv suggest
that in any case another reconstruction is required. The following
has some plausibility:
(3) Someone being musical has come to be literate
(3A) Someone being musical is literate
(3B) Someone being literate is musical
(4) Someone being literate has come to be musical.^
Here the move from (3) to (3A) rests on the principle, already
mentioned, that what a person has become he now is; the move from
(3A) to (3B) relies on the convertibility of an I-proposition; and the
move from (3B) to (4) rests on the premise, explicitly stated by
Aristotle, irav o av y, nrj ael de, yeyovev, together with the commonsense
assumption that a person who is musical has not always been so
(musical technique has to be learned).
Set out in this way, the fallacy is made plausible in English only
by a clumsily literal rendering of the Greek, retaining the participial
construction "being musical" and "being literate." A more natural
English version would be
(3') Someone who was musical has come to be literate
(3A') Someone who was musical is literate
(3B') Someone who was literate is musical
(4') Someone who was literate has come to be musical.
The present participle, in Greek as in English, has to represent both
the imperfect and the present tense of the finite verb. When relative
clauses are substituted this distinction between the present and
imperfect tense can be made explicit; and now the fallacious reasoning
can easily be seen to occur in the transition from (3A') to (3B'). We
have a pair of propositions not of the form "Some As are B" and
"Some B's are A," but of the form "Some As are B" and "Some C's
are D."
It should not be thought, however, that the fallacy rests simply on
a superficial feature of Greek, its inability to make fine tense distinc-
tions at the participial level. It would have been possible to set out
the sophism thus:
(3") Some musical person has come to be literate
(3A") Some musical person is literate
(3B") Some literate person is musical
(4") Some literate person has come to be musical.
^ An equally plausible translation would be obtained by deleting "Someone" and
inserting "he" after the second word in each of these sentences.
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Here there is nothing amiss with the move from (3A") to (3B"), but
the other steps are invalid. (This would be strikingly obvious if we
substituted "illiterate" for "musical" in (3") and (3A") and "unmus-
ical" for "literate" in (3B") and (4").) They are invalid because the
unexpressed tenses involved in the "subject-phrases," "Some musical
person" and "Some literate person," are different in the case of (3")
and (4"), where "has come to be" is the main verb of the sentence,
from what they are in the case of (3A") and (3B"), where the main
verb is "is." If these were made explicit, (3") would begin "Some
person who was musical," (3A") "Some person who is musical," (3B")
"Some person who is literate," and (4") "Some person who was
literate." The fallacies arrive through failure to appreciate the quan-
tificational structure of propositions whose "grammatical subject" is
of the form "Some musical person," or, for that matter, "The musical
person." Aristotle's distinction between accidental beings and unities
and per se beings and unities is an attempt to trace these fallacies to
their source. It is an attempt remarkably similar to that constituted
by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. '° He presents a wide variety of
sophisms which can be solved by application of the per se jper accidens
distinction. (A variation on the theme of the sophism outlined at
1026''18-20 is given at Metaphysics K 1064''23-26, and the same
sophism is hinted at in Topics 104''25, sqq.) Thus the fallacious
inference from (3") to (3A") can be seen to be due to allowing an
expression like "Some musical person," which in Aristotle's terms
stands for an accidental being, to be substituted for x in "If x has
come to be F then x is F"— a valid schema if names, which, in
Aristotle's terms, stand for per se beings, are substituted for x. Again,
the inference from (3B"), even if expanded to "Some literate person
is musical, but has not always been so," to (4") fails to exemplify the
schema "x is F, but not always; therefore x has come to be F," because
the expression substituted for x stands for an accidental being: put
the name of a per se being (a "logically proper name") in this position,
and all will be well. Since the topic of Metaphysics E. 2 is accidental
being, one might well have thought that this would be the moral he
wished us to draw.
If we had merely the exposition of the sophism in 1026''I8-20,
together with Aristotle's general theory of accidental being and his
'" I have tried to establish this similarity in my paper "Aristotle's Theory of
Descriptions" (above, note 7).
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indication that this would provide the clue to solving the sophism,
we should perhaps be content with the reconstruction of his thought
given in the previous section. But, as I have already argued, the
solution is supposed to be given by application of the thesis of
1026''22-24. (The thought is: the thesis receives support from its
ability to solve such paradoxes, and itself lends support to the doctrine
of the proximity of accidental being to non-being.) This, I believe,
shows that Aristotle interpreted the sophism in a way distinct from
those put forward in section III. What is at stake is the distinction
between what, in De Generatione et Corruptione I. 3, he calls "coming
to be airXcbq' and "coming to be something." The reconstruction that
is needed is the following:
(3'") Someone literate who is musical has come to be
(3A'") Someone literate who is musical is the same as someone
musical who is literate
(4'") Someone musical who is literate has come to be.
What we have is simply an application of the Law of the Substitutivity
of Identicals (Leibniz's Law), which allows us to pass from (3'") to
(4'") on the strength of the identity statement (3A'").
Understood in this way, the argument might well be accepted as
valid. The evident invalidity of the argument depended on inter-
preting novffLKoq (hv ypafi/xaTLKoc, yeyoue and ypannanKoq ojj' novaiKoq
yeyove as (3) and (4), respectively. It looks as though the sophists took
these sentences one way and Aristotle another. It is important,
therefore, to see how these Greek sentences are ambiguous as between
(3) and (4), on the one hand, and (3'") and (4'") on the other.
I have discussed in my note on De Gen. et Corn I. 4. 319^25-26,"
the parallel ambiguity of audpwToc, 5' aixovaoc, iyhero, which occurs
in Aristotle's text at that point. The context there, however, is his
attempt to distinguish alteration, aXXoiooaLq, from generation and
corruption, yeveatq Kal <pdopa. He is arguing that if avdpojiroc, anovaoq
eyeveTo could be construed in the same way as vypbv ypvxpov iyevero
(which would describe the generation of water), where cold is not a
per se affection of wet, as unmusical is of man, it would report a case
of generation. As it is (319''30-31), it is a case of alteration. Unfor-
tunately, Aristotle does not stick to his distinction between yiyviadai
airXOiq and yiyvdadai tl, the existential and copulative senses of "come
to be," in order to disambiguate avdpoi-Koq ci^lOvaoc, eyevero and distin-
guish generation and alteration. He allows an existential interpretation
" Aristotle's "De Generatione et Corruptione," in the Clarendon Aristotle Series
(Oxford 1982), p. 101.
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of the sentence and transfers the distinction from yiyveadai to its
subject. In avdpoi-Koc, eyevero the subject, man, is a per se being, so the
sentence reports a case of generation; in audpwiroq ctfiovaoq eyepero
the subject, unmusical man, is an accidental being, so the sentence
reports a case of alteration. As I remarked in my note on the passage,
Aristotle thus cuts away the ground from under the feet of his own
distinction.'^
Here, in the Metaphysics passage, it seems to me, it is by interpreting
fxovoLKoc, <j)v ypannazLKoq yeyove as "Someone literate who is musical
has come to be" and ypamxaTiKOc, o)v (xovaiKoq (ykyovi) as "Someone
musical who is literate has come to be" that Aristotle argues that the
one entails the other. For the "literate musical" is the same accidental
being as the "musical literate" (3A'"), and if "has come to be" is
truly predicable of the one it is truly predicable of the other. Moreover,
so the argument goes, since this accidental being "is, but not always"
(for there was a time, according to (3), when the musical was not
literate), "has come to be" must be truly predicable of it under either
description. Aristotle's answer, that there is no coming to be of
accidental beings, challenges the premise of this last part of the
argument. Accidental being is not covered by the phrase "is, but not
always," since accidental being is not fully entitled to be said to be',
in some ways, Aristotle holds, it is closer to what is not. This seems,
if anything, to be his misleading way of saying that a sentence like
IxovaiKoq (hv ypanfianKOc, yeyoue cannot be understood in the sense
"Someone literate who is musical has come to be," but only in the
sense expressed by (3).
However, there is a sentence in De Generatione et Corruptione which
seems flatly to contradict this interpretation o{ Metaphysics 1026''22-24,
At 319''29-30 the text reads:
bib avdpoiTTOv p.lv ravra iradt}, avSpCiivov bt hovglkov KaX audpooirov
bifiovaov yeveaiq Kal (pdopa.
TavTOi are musicality and unmusicality. "Musical man" and "unmusical
man" are often said to be names for accidental beings, and this
sentence attributes to them, explicitly, yeveatq Kal (pdopa. But at
1026''23-24 Aristotle says there is no ykveoiq Kal (t>dopa of accidental
beings. When I was preparing my notes on the De Generatione et
Corruptione, I was not aware of this sentence in the Metaphysics. Had
I been so aware, I should have felt more inclined than I was to regard
319''29-30 as an alien intrusion into the text. Philoponus and Joachim
are both unhappy with the text as it stands, and Philoponus suspects
'2 Op. cit., p. 102.
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a scribal error. However that may be, the doctrine of De Generatione
et Corruptione demands that there be a sense of ytveaiq in which it is
contrasted with aWo'niiaic,, and in this sense what avBpoiitoc, ocfiovaoq
iyevero and (3) and (4) report are not cases of generation or corruption,
but of alteration. Whatever the verbal clash with 319''29-30, the
overall doctrine of De Generatione et Corruptione I. 3-4 fully justifies
the interpretation of 1026''22-24 as denying that there is generation
and corruption of accidental beings. The reason for the denial is not
that such changes are instantaneous, but that there are no such
changes. The sophist argues for the paradoxical conclusion that either
(3) entails (4) or the principle "What is, but not always has come to
be" must be abandoned. Aristotle's reply is that we need not fear
that the truth of ixovoiKoq <hu ypafifiar lkoc, yeyove will entail that of
ypannariKoc, oov ixovaiKoq yeyove, since, in the sense in which the former
will entail the latter, in the sense, namely, of (3'"), the former is not
going to be true at all. Accidental beings, such as "Someone literate
who is musical" is supposed to stand for, are not subjects of yeveatq
or (t)dopa. We have no need to jettison the principle irav o av y, iirj
ael be, y'eyovev, because in the only sense in which it is relevant to
that principle, /xovaiKoq o)v ypaufxarLKoq eoTLv, ovk ael de is false. The
principle should be interpreted, Aristotle is suggesting, as equivalent
to TTQiJ' av
J) airXibq, fir] ael de, airXC^q y'eyovev. But novaiKoq Lov
ypannariKoq eariv dcTrXcbc, would be asserting per se being falsely of an
accidental being; so the principle has no application in this case.
VI
My argument has been that neither E. 2 nor E. 3 is concerned with
the distinction between gradual and instantaneous change. The point
of the sentence in E. 2 to which this distinction was thought to be
relevant is, I maintain, to restrict yeveacc, to what elsewhere Aristotle
calls bcTrXr] yeveaiq, "coming to be simpliciter!' The sentences in E. 3
for whose interpretation translators have thought it necessary to use
the word "process" are, in my view, saying that some comings to be,
namely those which are accidental, are not necessitated by prior
causes. But, it will be objected, these interpretations of E. 2 and E.
3 are incompatible with each other. In E. 2 I make Aristotle say that
only per se beings come to be. In E. 3 I attribute to him a theory
about the coming to be of ovra Kara crvfxlSefirjKoq.
On the surface the incompatibility is there anyway. In 1026''22-24
Aristotle denies that there is yevecnq of ovra Kara avu^e^rjKoq. But in
1026''33 and 1027''7, before we have even reached the end of chapter
2, Aristotle is using yiyveadai to refer to accidental beings. Little
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wonder that he does so again in chapter 3! The point is that Aristotle's
use of Yfj'fcriq and yiyueadaL is far from uniform. Sometimes aXXoiojaiq
is described as a subordinate species of yeveaiq; sometimes yeveatq is
a species co-ordinate with aWoiojaLq. I am not, in this paper, concerned
to affirm that there is a single sense of yiyveadai or yeveaiq, to be
found in the sentences of E. 2 and E. 3 we have been examining:
rather, I am concerned to deny that these words are used in these
sentences in the single sense of a "process" of coming to be, in a
sense which rules out instantaneous change. My belief is that passages
in Aristotle's works that have been interpreted as devoted to the
distinction between gradual and instantaneous coming to be have less
unity than has been supposed. The passages in Metaphysics E which
have been thought to require this interpretation should, I have
argued, be understood in other ways, though not in just one other
way. To deal thoroughly with the "process" interpretation it would
be necessary to examine the long list of passages cited, e.g., by Ross
in his note on 1026*^22-24, to see how many of them require us to
talk of gradual or instantaneous change. If they all do, my interpre-
tation of E. 2 and 3 is called in question. I think in fact that many
of them do not; but there is hardly room here to justify this claim.
It is a topic for another paper.
University of Bristol
